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CAN A LOUISIANA UNIT ORDER BE EFFECTIVE
RETROACTIVELY?
INTRODUCTION
In order to prevent waste and avoid the drilling of unnecessary oil
and gas wells, the Louisiana Commissioner of Conservation is given the
power to force the pooling of mineral interests into drilling units.' The
area within the drilling unit and the allocation of production from the
unit well is set forth in an order issued by the Commissioner. 2 Of
principal concern to those whose land lies within the unit is the point
at which they begin to share in production. Until the unit order becomes
effective, only the producing tract receives production and other tracts
do not share.3 Therefore, the issue arises whether a Louisiana unit order,
which requires the sharing of production, may have retroactive effect.
A related question involves the point at which the sharing of production
should occur. 4
The following hypothetical situation illustrates the problem. Assume
A owns a tract of land adjacent to a tract owned by B. On January
1st, A completes a producing well on his tract. On February 1st, B
files an application with the Commissioner of Conservation requesting
the creation of a unit comprising the tracts owned by A and B. The
Commissioner issues a unit order on March 15th and makes the order
effective as of that day.6 During this two-and-one-half month period,
A continues to produce oil and gas, some of which migrates from
beneath B's tract. Once B files the application for unitization, the
Commissioner will not issue new drilling permits pending the outcome
Copyright 1989, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. La. R.S. 30:9(B) (1989). "For the prevention of waste and to avoid the drilling
of unnecessary wells, the commissioner shall establish a drilling unit or units for each
pool .... ." Id.
2. Id. art. 9-10.
3. "Until such time as a unit is created, no other tract is entitled to production
from a well." Desormeaux v. Inexco Oil, 298 So. 2d 897, 899 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ
denied, 302 So. 2d 37 (1974).
4. Professor Owen Anderson, in an article addressing this issue, asserts that "a
compulsory pooling order normally should be retroactive to the date of first production."
Anderson, Compulsory Pooling in North Dakota: Should Production Income and Expenses
be Divided From Date of Pooling, Spacing, or "First Runs"?, 58 N.D.L. Rev. 537, 573
(1982).
5. La. R.S. 30:6 (1989).
6. Id.
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of the unitization proceeding. 7 Hence, for the one-and-a-half month
period from the filing of B's application until the Commissioner enters
the unit order, B's property is drained although B is prohibited from
drilling an offset well to protect against drainage.
If a dispute develops over who is entitled to share in the minerals
produced during this period, both A and B may argue that property
has been taken without compensation. B will contend that the Com-
missioner's denying him the right to drill an offset well pending uni-
tization constitutes an unconstitutional taking of his property.' In order
to compensate him for the deprival of his right to drill, B will argue,
the unit order must take effect retroactively to the date of the application
for unitization. A, on the other hand, will argue that the unit order
cannot be made retroactive, for to do so would constitute a taking of
his property.9 A will assert that under the Louisiana Mineral Code, oil
and gas reduced to possession become his property. 0 Making a unit
order effective retroactively and forcing A to share minerals that he has
reduced to his possession would take property from him for the sole
purpose of compensating and benefitting B, A will contend.
The contentions of A and B squarely present the issue that is the
subject of this article: May a unit order be given retroactive effect
without constituting a taking? This article investigates the issue in four
sections. The first section gives a brief overview of Louisiana's theory
of mineral ownership and the rights of a landowner under the Louisiana
Mineral Code. This section also includes a discussion of those few
Louisiana decisions that touch upon this issue. Section two considers
the judicial responses to this issue by other states with more well-
developed jurisprudence. Section three examines the compatibility of
other jurisdictions' positions with the Louisiana law of mineral own-
ership. This section also shows the problems associated with retroactivity
and presents an alternative by which Louisiana may protect the rights
of affected landowners. In section four, this author concludes that a
unit order may not have retroactive effect in Louisiana and that an
7. It is standard practice for the Commissioner of Conservation to deny drilling
permits to adjacent landowners once an application for unitization is filed. Such a denial
fulfills the Commissioner's mandate to prevent waste and the drilling of unnecessary wells.
Interview with Patrick H. Martin, Professor of Law, Louisiana State University; former
Louisiana Commissioner of Conservation, in Baton Rouge, Louisiana (February 17, 1989).
8. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent
part: "No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."
Article 1, section 2 of the Louisiana Constitution provides, "No person shall be deprived
of life, liberty, or property except by due process of law."
9. Id.
10. La. R.S. 31:7 (1989).
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alternative is available by which the rights and interests of all parties
may be protected.
A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF MINERAL OWNERSHIP IN LOUISIANA
The Louisiana Mineral Code" sets out the principles governing min-
eral ownership in Louisiana. The Mineral Code adopts the "nonown-
ership" theory of minerals. Under that view, ownership of land does
not include ownership of oil and gas lying beneath the surface.' 2 The
landowner does, however, have the "exclusive right to explore and
develop his property for the production of such minerals and to reduce
them to possession and ownership."' 3 Ownership of oil and gas vests
when the minerals are reduced to possession.' 4 The Mineral Code further
provides that a landowner "may reduce to possession and ownership
all of the minerals . that can be obtained by operations on or beneath
his land even though his operations may cause this migration from
beneath the land of another."' 5 Thus, a producing landowner ordinarily
need not reimburse his neighbor for oil and gas taken from beneath
his neighbor's property. 6
The rights created under the Mineral Code are not absolute. Louis-
iana law, recognizing that a neighboring landowner whose property
overlies the common reservoir should have some rights in that reservoir,
creates a reciprocal relationship between a producing landowner and his
neighbor. 7 The landowner has no ownership interest in the common
reservoir, but the theory of correlative rights recognizes that he, like
his producing neighbor, has the right to develop his property, protect
it from drainage, and "utilize the natural reservoir energy."'"
Prior to the development of conservation law, to protect one's
property from drainage by a producing neighbor, "the remedy of the
injured landowner . . . [was] to be that of self-help-'go and do like-
11. Id. arts. 1-215.
12. Id. art. 6 provides: "Ownership of land does not include ownership of oil, gas,
and other minerals occurring naturally in liquid or gaseous form ..
13. Id.
14. La. R.S. 31:6-8 (1989). See generally Allies Oil Co. v. Ayers, 152 La. 19, 92
So. 720 (1922); Succession of Rigg, 339 So. 2d 519 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976), writ denied,
341 So. 2d 897 (1970).
15. La. R.S. 31:8 (1989).
16. Id. art. 14. Note that such production must be legitimate and cannot be in
violation of Revised Statutes 31:10 (1989). See also id. art. 10 comments.
17. Id. art. 9 provides: "Landowners and others with rights in a common reservoir
or deposit of minerals have correlative rights and duties with respect to one another in
the development and production of the common source of minerals."
18. Id. comment.
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wise.' "19 Each landowner, to protect his property, was forced to drill
his own well. This resulted in the drilling of unnecessary wells that were
harmful to the efficient production of the reservoir. The waste resulting
from such drilling led to the creation of conservation law. 20
The conservation statutes of Louisiana,2 to remedy the waste created
by the drilling of unnecessary wells, mandate the forced pooling of
mineral interests into drilling units22 when interest owners fail to pool
voluntarily. 23 Once a unit is established, those landowners whose land
lies within the unit are prohibited from exercising their right to explore
and develop their property for oil and gas. However, unitization will
eventually give them some compensation by letting them share in pro-
duction and insuring that they receive their "just and equitable share
of the reservoir content." ' 24
Louisiana has not yet determined whether a unit order may or must
be effective retroactively. 25 Three Louisiana cases have approached the
issue of retroactivity, but none has resolved it. The earliest Louisiana
case that touched upon the issue was Desormeaux v. Inexco Oil Co.26
The facts of that case presented a retroactivity question, but the court
19. 1 H. Williams & C. Meyers, Oil & Gas. Law § 204.4, at 57 (1988).
20. See generally Moosa and Saloom, The Oil and Gas Conservation Movement in
Louisiana, 16 Tul. L. Rev. 199 (1942); Nunez v. Wainoco Oil & Gas Co., 488 So. 2d
955, 959-62 (La. 1986).
21. La. R.S. 30:1-2396 (1989).
22. Drilling units are defined in Louisiana Revised Statute 30:9 as "the maximum
area which may be efficiently and economically drained by one well." Id. art. 9(B).
23. La. R.S. 31:10(A)(1) in part provides:
A. When two or more separately owned tracts of land are embraced within a
drilling unit which has been established by the commissioner as provided in
R.S. 30:9B, the owners may validly agree to pool their interests and to develop
their lands as a drilling unit.
(1) Where the owners have not agreed to pool their interests, the commissioner
shall require them to do so and to develop their lands as a drilling unit, if he
finds it to be necessary to prevent waste or to avoid drilling unnecessary wells.
24. Id. arts. 9, 10.
25. In a letter dated April 11, 1983, Commissioner Patrick H. Martin expressed
concern over those parties whose property was being drained pending the issuance of a
unit order. Commissioner Martin believed that some protection should be afforded those
parties. To protect those parties affected, Commissioner Martin determined that pending
the issuance of a unit order, allowables would only be issued upon a unit basis. The
effect of this determination was to allow those parties whose property was being drained
while unitization was pending, to share in production prior to the issuance of the unit
order.
In a memo dated August 20, 1985, Commissioner Herbert W. Thompson stated that
"[o]rders issued by the Commissioner under Title 30 shall be effective only after testimony
is received and entered of record. Hence, no Order will be given an effective date earlier
than the date that all evidence has been received and the hearing concluded."
26. 298 So. 2d 897 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 302 So. 2d 37 (1974).
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did not directly address it. The plaintiff in Desormeaux, as owner of
land within a unit, sought to share in all production of the unit well
since the date of first production. The third circuit rejected the lan-
downer's claims, holding that "until such time as a unit is created, no
other tract is entitled to production from a well." ' 27 Although a landowner
does have the exclusive right to explore and develop his land, reasoned
the court, he does not own the oil and gas beneath the property. 2
Under the rule of capture, whoever first possesses the minerals owns
them. Hence, the court concluded, except insofar as the conservation
statutes had modified the rule of capture, the landowner could not claim
any of the production.
The Desormeaux court next defined how far the conservation statutes
had modified the rule of capture. The court declared that unitization
"modifies the rule of capture only to the extent that each ... tract
will receive its just and equitable share of [the] reservoir content. ' 29
This modification allowed the Commissioner to force sharing once the
unit is created, said the court, but it did not grant any right to production
before the unit existed. In the Desormeaux court's view, the conservation
statutes do not disturb the rule of capture as it applies to pre-unit
production.
The facts of the Desormeaux case very clearly raised an issue of
retroactivity. The Commissioner issued the unit order on August 7, 1971,
but the order was made effective from June 30, 1971.3 0 Each party,
then, had an argument that property had been taken improperly. The
producer could have protested the retroactive effect by citing the very
rule of capture the court relied upon. The producer could have claimed
that it owned the minerals produced between June 30th and August 7th,
and that making the unit order effective retroactively took those minerals
from it without compensation. The landowner also had a taking claim.
From the time of the application for the unit order, the landowner was
forbidden to drill. By taking away the right to drill, which the plaintiff
would argue is a property right, a taking might have occurred. Neither
party, however, raised these arguments, and the Desormeaux court did
not take up the issue on its own.
The third circuit reaffirmed the Desormeaux holding in Pierce v.
Goldking.31 In Pierce, a lessor sued his lessee for failing to protect his
27. Id. at 899.
28. Id. "Under the law of capture, the landowner is not the owner of minerals
beneath the surface of his lands. He has The right to search for and draw the minerals
through the soil and thereby become the owner." Id.
29. Id. "The creation of a drilling unit modifies the rule of capture only to the
extent that the Commissioner's finding indicates unitization should reasonably insure each
tract will receive its just and equitable share of reservoir content." Id.
30. Id. at 898.
31. 396 So. 2d 528 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 400 So. 2d 904 (1981).
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property from drainage by a well on adjacent property. The lessor sought
to share in the "pre-unit production. 3 2 The court found that since the
lessor was "not entitled to receive royalties until such time as the effective
date of the unit,"33 the lessor's argument had no merit.
Since that case, only one court, again the third circuit, has addressed
the question. In Burley v. Sunbelt Royalty, Inc.,3 the lessor argued
"that the Department's order of May 1, 1984, should be applied ret-
roactively to November 1, 1982." 3 The court concluded that the lessor
"offered no authority for this proposition" and refused to address the
issue . 6 This abrupt dismissal of the claim implies that, in the third
circuit at least, the issue is settled: unit orders may not take effect
retroactively.
In sum, the Louisiana courts have had three opportunities to address
this issue. The courts have made it clear that until a unit is created,
adjacent tracts are not entitled to share in production. Therefore, a unit
order may not be made effective prior to the establishment of a unit.
THE RETROACTIVITY ISSUE IN VARIOUS JURISDICTIONS
Other oil and gas producing states have adopted compulsory uni-
tization.3 7 Although laws governing unitization vary from state to state,
certain issues created by compulsory unitization are common to all states
that employ such a scheme. One common issue is whether a unit order
requiring the sharing of production may be effective retroactively.
This section will examine the extent to which Texas, Oklahoma,
and Nebraska have addressed this issue. The theories of mineral own-
ership adopted by these states are not identical, nor are their compulsory
unitization laws. For this reason, no two states have come to identical
conclusions on the question whether a unit order may have retroactive
effect. Nonetheless, jurisprudence from these states illustrates the varying
policies and interests that must be considered in determining whether a
unit order may take effect retroactively.
32. Id. at 529.
33. Id. at 534.
34. 534 So. 2d 101 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988).
35. Id. at 102.
36. Id.
•37. It is important to note that the effect that the creation of a unit has varies from
state to state. In some states, the spacing of wells and the allocation of production are
not determined simultaneously. In many states, for example, a spacing order initially
establishes the area within the unit, and a later pooling order allocates production. By
contrast, a Louisiana unit order directs both the spacing of wells and the allocation of
production.
For purposes of this comment, unitization will refer to the spacing and pooling of
mineral interests into drilling units and will not refer to fieldwide unitization.
1124 [Vol. 49
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Texas
Texas adopts the "ownership in place theory."3" Under this theory,
the landowner may create a separate mineral estate, apart from ownership
of the land.3 9 Ownership of oil and gas is vested even while the oil and
gas is beneath the surface of the land, whether or not the oil and gas
is reduced to possession. Despite the ownership in place theory, own-
ership of oil and gas beneath one's property may be lost under the rule
of capture by legitimate drainage. 4"
The state of Texas developed conservation laws to prevent waste
and the drilling of unnecessary wells caused in part by the operation
of the rule of capture. The Mineral Interest Pooling Act 4 authorizes
the Railroad Commission to force the pooling of mineral interests under
certain circumstances. The Commission cannot force the pooling of
mineral interests, however, absent a petition from an owner of affected
mineral interests.4 2 The law requires that an owner seeking pooling must
first make a "fair and reasonable" offer of voluntary pooling to the
producing party.4 3 If the producing party refuses, the interest owner
may then petition the Railroad Commission for a pooling order."
Once a pooling order is issued, the question arises whether the order
may be effective retroactively. A Texas court addressed this issue in
Buttes Resources Co. v. Railroad Commission of Texas.45 The conflict
arose between the operator of existing units, Buttes, and the owner of
the the mineral interests underneath land adjacent to these units, Schnei-
der. After an unsuccessful attempt at voluntary pooling, Schneider ap-
plied to the Railroad Commission to force the pooling of his interests
with the units operated by Buttes. Hearings were held, and, sixty days
later, the Railroad Commission issued an order pooling a portion of
38. "The theory that a landowner owns the oil and gas which was originally in place
beneath his surface acreage." 8 H. Williams & C. Meyers, Oil & Gas Law 683 (1987).
See Stephens County v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co., 113 Tex. 160, 254 S.W. 290 (1923).
39. "Under this theory, the landowner may create by grant or reservation a corporeal
or possessory interest in the minerals separate from the estate in the surface." 8 H.
Williams & C. Meyers, supra note 38 at 683.
40. See Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 146 Tex. 575, 210 S.W.2d 558 (1948). "In
Texas, and in other jurisdictions, a different rule exists as to ownership. In our state the
landowner is regarded as having absolute title in severalty to the oil and gas in place
beneath his land. The only qualification of that rule of ownership is that it must be
considered in connection with the law of capture .. " Id. at 561 (citations omitted).
41. Tex. Nat. Res. Code Ann. §§ 102.001-.112 (Vernon 1978).
42. Id. §§ 102.011-.012 (Vernon 1978).
43. Id. § 102.013 (Vernon 1978).
44. See generally Douglass & Whitworth, Selected Topics on Oil and Gas Law-
Practice Before the Oil and Gas Division of the Railroad Commission of Texas, 13 St.
Mary's L.J. 719, 740-51 (1982).
45. 732 S.W.2d 675 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
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Schneider's interests with part of a unit operated by Buttes.4 6 The
Commission made the order effective retroactively to the date of the
hearing. Buttes then brought suit to attack the validity of this order.
A Texas appellate court upheld the pooling order but refused to
allow the order to take effect retroactively.47 The court, however, gave
little explanation for its conclusion. Citing the Texas Constitution, the
court stated that a retroactive pooling order would interfere with a
producing owner's vested property rights a. 4  As further support for its
position, the court quoted language from an earlier case, Superior Oil
Co. v. Railroad Commission,49 which had indicated that one has a vested
property right to do with one's property as one desires.5 0 In other words,
the Buttes court concluded that retroactive application of a pooling order
would interfere with the property owner's vested right to do what he
pleases with his property. Reliance on this vague right to have absolute
control of property makes the Superior case somewhat dubious, but it
remains the law of Texas.
In sum, the Texas courts have concluded that a pooling order may
not be retroactive. The Texas position may not be as persuasive as it
could be because the reasoning of the Texas courts seems imprecise.
Oklahoma
Oklahoma, like Louisiana, adopts both the "nonownership theory"51
46. Id. at 677.
47. " Id. at 682. "[T]he earlier effective date resulted in an unconstitutional retroactive
interference with vested property rights. Tex. Const. art. 1, § 16. The MIPA is clearly
'in derogation of the right of one to do with his own property as he so desires,' Superior
Oil Co. v. Railroad Commission." Id. (citation omitted).
In American Operating Co. v. Railroad Comm. of Texas, the same court reaffirmed
its holding by stating: "In Buttes Resources . . .we held that the Railroad Commission
is without authority to make such an order effective prior to the time it is signed. We
adhere to that holding." 744 S.W.2d 149, 156 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
48. Art. 1, § 16 reads as follows: "No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, retroactive
law, or any law impairing the obligation of contracts, shall be made."
The official comment says:
A retroactive law is one meant to act on things that are past. As such, a statute
is retroactive which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing
laws, or creates new obligations, imposes new duties, or adopts a new disability
in respect to transactions or considerations already past, and which affects acts
or rights accruing before it came into force. ...
It is to be noted that unless vested rights are destroyed or impaired, the law
is not invalid even though retroactive in operation. Paschal v. Perex, 7 T[ex].
348 (1851); City of Ft. Worth v. Morrow, Civ. App., 284 S.W. 274, error
refused (1926). However, to be a vested right, it need not be strictly speaking
a property right.
49. 519 S.W.2d 479 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
50. Id. at 482.
51. This theory has been defined by Williams and Meyers as "[tihe theory that no
1126 [Vol. 49
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and the rule of capture.52 Oklahoma's unitization laws are also similar
to those of Louisiana. The Oklahoma courts, however, have already
resolved the issue of whether a pooling order may take effect retro-
actively.53 To understand the Oklahoma approach, a close review of that
state's case law will be useful.
The earliest Oklahoma case addressing whether a pooling order could
take effect retroactively is Wood Oil Co. v. Corporation Commission.54
This case involved a pooling order directing a producer to share pro-
duction from the date of first production with an adjacent tract.55 On
December 21, 1946, Wood Oil completed a well and began producing.
Toklan Producing Company had a mineral interest on property adjacent
to the Wood Oil tract. On April 1, 1947, the Corporation Commission,
Oklahoma's conservation authority, established the boundaries of the
drilling unit. The acreage in which Toklan had a mineral interest was
within this unit. Attempts at voluntary pooling failed, and, in July,
1947, Toklan applied for compulsory pooling. The Corporation Com-
mission issued a pooling order that instructed Wood Oil to share pro-
duction with Toklan from the date of first production. 6
Wood Oil appealed the retroactive effect of the order. The Oklahoma
Supreme Court, accepting Wood Oil's contentions, reversed the order.
The court reasoned "that Wood Oil had title absolute to the oil and
gas" produced prior to the creation of a drilling unit. Hence, until such
time as a drilling unit was created, Toklan was not entitled to share in
production.1
7
person owns oil and gas until it is produced, but that the right to produce is limited to
those persons who own land upon which a well may be drilled." 8 H. Williams & C.
Meyers, supra note 38 at 619. Some however classify Oklahoma as adopting a "qualified
ownership theory." "The theory that landowners whose tracts overlay a producing for-
mation have correlative rights in the formation." Id. at 796.
52. "[U]nder the 'law of capture' which obtains in Oklahoma, a landowner does not
own migratory substances underlying his land, but has an exclusive right to drill for,
produce, or otherwise gain possession of such substances, subject only to restrictions and
regulations pursuant to police power." Frost v. Ponca City, 541 P.2d 1321, 1323 (Okla.
1975).
53. C. H. Kuykendall v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 741 P.2d 869 (Okla. 1987). See
infra text accompanying notes 66-73.
54. 205 Okla. 537, 239 P.2d 1023 (1950).
55. Id. at 537, 239 P.2d at 1025.
56. Id. at 538, 239 P.2d at 1025.
57. Id. at 539, 239 P.2d at 1026.
We think it follows from this statement of the law that Wood Oil had title
absolute to the oil by it produced prior to the pooling. We find nothing in the
conservation law that purports to disturb the title of the producer thereto. The
effect of the order of the commission is to treat the unitization effective as of
the time of the drilling of the well and the interest of Toklan in the production
coincident with that of Wood Oil. To the extent the order holds Wood Oil
19891 1127
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The Oklahoma Supreme Court again addressed this issue in L. 0.
Ward v. Corporation Commission." In January, 1969, Ward completed
a well on a section of land, owned in part by Tenneco. In February,
1969, Tenneco filed an application seeking the creation of a 640-acre
drilling unit. In March, 1969, Ward filed an application seeking the
creation of a 160-acre drilling unit. In June, 1969, the Corporation
Commission combined the two applications and issued a spacing order
establishing drilling units on a 640-acre basis. 9 Ward appealed this order
but was unsuccessful. 60 In February, 1971, the Corporation Commission
issued a pooling order, which was amended in May, 1971. The effect
of the May amendment was that "Tenneco was entitled to participate
in the production from the well from and after June 26, 1969, which
is the date of the spacing order." ' 6' Ward appealed this order.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court concluded that Tenneco's right to
share in production arose when Tenneco's right to drill was denied. 62
The court determined that the governing statute prevented Tenneco from
exercising its right to drill after the spacing order was issued, 63 and that
the denial of this property right64 without compensation would be a
"taking by the State of [Tenneco's] property without due process in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States." ' 65 The court determined that the denial did not occur until the
accountable to Toklan directly or indirectly for a share in the production before
the spacing unit was created, same is not authorized by law and it was error
to so hold.
Id.
58. 501 P.2d 503 (Okla. 1972).
59. Id. at 504.
60. Ward v. Corporation Comm'n, 470 P.2d 993 (Okla. 1970).
61. 501 P.2d at 504.
62. Id. at 507.
63. Id.
64. "We have recognized mineral owner's right to reduce minerals to possession is
a valuable property right." Frost v. Ponca City, 541 P.2d 1321, 1323 (Okla. 1975) (citing
Wright v. Carter Oil Co., 97 Okla. 46, 223 P. 835 (1923)).
65. 501 P.2d at 507.
At the time the unit is established a unit well is or probably soon will be
producing oil or gas. At the moment production commences, resulting pressure
differentials in the common source of supply portend, in greater or less degree,
drainage from all parts of the unit toward the producing unit well. This drainage
is occurring from areas where oil and gas lessees are prohibited from doing
anything to protect their leased premises from drainage. With the purpose of
§ 87.1 to prevent the drilling of unnecessary wells before it, the Commission
will not, except in extreme cases, make an exception to the rule that permits
one producing well only on each spacing (drilling) unit. To impose this denial
without granting the right to participate in production of unit well, as of the
time the non-drilling owners were prohibited from drilling, is the taking by the
1128 [Vol. 49
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unit was created and therefore Tenneco's right to share in production
did not arise until that time. The decision was consistent with Wood
in that no sharing of production occurs prior to the creation of a unit.
In C. H. Kuykendall v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc. ,6 the Oklahoma
Supreme Court modified this position, concluding that a pooling order
must be effective retroactively to the date that the application is filed.
In this case, Helmerich & Payne, the mineral lessee, commenced drilling
a well on a tract adjacent to the leased property. On December 9, 1976,
Helmerich & Payne applied for the creation of a unit that included the
leased property. The unit hearing occurred during the lease term, but
the order was not signed until December 21, 1976, one day after the
lease was set to expire.6 7 If the unit order was given retroactive effect
either to the date of the hearing or before, the lease would not have
expired. Both the trial court and appellate court held that the lease had
not expired,6 s and the lessors appealed to the Oklahoma Supreme Court.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court concluded that the effective date of the
order was to be the date an application for spacing is filed.
In addressing the effective date of the order, the court relied upon
its reasoning in Ward: In Ward, "this Court noted that withdrawing
an owner's right to drill without granting the right to participate in the
proceeds of the unit well amounted to the taking by the state of owner's
property without due process .... ,69 The court in Ward based this
determination on its interpretation of a United States Supreme Court
case, Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Corp.70 The Oklahoma
Supreme Court interpreted Thompson as saying that the withdrawal of
an adjacent landowner's right to drill is the taking of a property right
such that compensation is required.
In determining when the right to drill was denied, the court looked
to the Oklahoma statute that prohibits the drilling of a well once an
application for spacing is filed. 71 The court, based upon the language
State of their property without due process in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Thompson v. Consolidated
Gas Utilities Corp., 300 U.S. 55, 57 S: Ct. 364, 81 L.Ed. 510.
Id.
66. 741 P.2d 869 (Okla. 1987).
67. Id. at 870.
68. Id. at 869.
69. Id. at 873; see supra- note 65.
70. 300 U.S. 55, 57 S. Ct. 364 (1937). See supra note 65.
71. 52 O.S. 1981 § 87.1(e). Kuykendall, 741 P.2d at 871:
The drilling of any well or wells into any common source of supply for the
purpose of producing oil or gas therefrom, after a spacing order has been
entered by the Commission covering such common source of supply, at a location
other than that fixed by said order is hereby prohibited. The drilling of any
well or wells into a common source of supply, covered by a pending spacing
1989] 1129
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of this statute, determined that a landowner's right to drill is withdrawn
at the time an application for spacing is filed and therefore the right
to share in production from the unit well arises at that time. 72 The
court reasoned that in order to avoid an unconstitutional taking of
property, the sharing of production must occur when the right to drill
is denied, and therefore a pooling order must be effective retroactively. 73
In sum, Oklahoma prohibits the drilling of a well once an application
for spacing is filed. The Oklahoma Supreme Court has concluded that
such a denial constitutes a taking of property such that compensation
is required. The Oklahoma Supreme Court has therefore concluded that
a pooling order must be effective retroactively from the time an ap-
plication for spacing is filed to avoid the unconstitutional taking of
property.
Nebraska
The Nebraska Supreme Court addressed whether a pooling order
may be effective retroactively in Farmers Irrigation District v. Schu-
macher.74 On October 15, 1964, White Feather completed a producing
well on a Government Lot, part of which was owned by Farmers
Irrigation District. Over two years later, Farmers Irrigation District
applied with the Nebraska Oil and Gas Conservation Commission for
a pooling order and asked that the order be made effective retroactively
to the date of first production. 75 The commission issued the order as
requested. 76 White Feather brought suit to reverse the Commission's
order, and the case eventually reached the Nebraska Supreme Court.
The Nebraska Supreme Court allowed the pooling order to take
effect retroactively to the date of first production. 77 In so deciding, the
court noted that the Nebraska Conservation Act modified the rule of
capture in order to protect the correlative rights of those with interests
in the common pool. 78 For Farmers Irrigation District to receive its just
application, at a location other than that approved by a special order of the
Commission authorizing the drilling of such a well is hereby prohibited ....
72. 741 P.2d at 873.
73. In Roberts v. Funk Exploration, Inc., 764 P.2d 147 (Okla. 1988), the Oklahoma
Supreme Court affirmed an order "making the unit effective from [the] date of appli-
cation."
74. 187 Neb. 825, 194 N.W.2d 788 (1972).
75. 187 Neb. at 826, 194 N.W.2d at 789.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 833, 194 N.W.2d at 792. However, retroactive application must not be
inequitable.
78. Id. at 831-32, 194 N.W.2d at 791.
Under the common law rule of capture, appellees would have been entitled to
all oil produced and appellants only remedy would have been to drill its own
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and equitable share, concluded the court, the pooling order must take
effect retroactively to the date of first production. 79 The court announced
a rule of qualified retroactivity 0 stating that there may be instances in
which equity could not justify a retroactive order."1 In the case at issue,
the court found the order to be "fair and equitable."
8 2
The Nebraska Supreme Court again addressed this issue in Ohmart
v. Dennis.3 The Commission had issued an order pooling the interests
in a tract of land, and the producing landowner sued to void the order. 84
The trial court made the pooling order effective retroactively to the date
well. With the adoption of the Oil and Gas Conservation Act, a landowner
could no longer so protect his interest. It became necessary to get a drilling
permit and the act contemplates that there shall be only one well if that one
can adequately pump out the oilin the pool. Here the appellants are entirely
dependent for protection on the pooling order allocating to them a share in
the production .... [Sleveral sections of the act consistently stress the protection
of correlative rights. They are clearly designed to protect adjoining landowners
under whose lands a pool may extend.
Id.
79. Id. at 832, 194 N.W.2d at 791-92. "[T]o permit an adjoining owner to obtain,
recover, and receive his just and equitable share, the pooling order may be made retroactive
to the time production started .... . Id.
80. Id., 194 N.W.2d at 792. "We do not mean to say that this should be done in
every instance." Id.
81. Id.
To permit an adjoining owner to sit back and await the successful outcome of
drilling operations without asking for a pooling agreement would place the entire
risk and the entire expense upon the party drilling in the event of an unsuccessful
operation. This would ordinarily be inequitable and not justify a retroactive
order.
Id.
82. Id. at 832-33, 194 N.W.2d at 792.
In this case, due to the early notice of a claim to pooling rights given appellees
by appellants, and to the obvious delaying tactics pursued by appellees, although
proceedings before the commission were not commenced as early as they might
have been, we are inclined to believe that limiting the pooling order to the date
of commencement of such proceedings is not justified and that the order should
be made retroactive at least to the date notice of appellants' claim was given. ...
[Wie find the order to be fair and equitable.
The dissent recognized the right to share in production from the date an application for
spacing is filed. While the dissenting judge acknowledged that a pooling order may in
fact be retroactive to some point in time, he asserted that it could not be made effective
from the date of first production. Instead, the dissenter believed "that the date of
application or motion for the establishment of the spacing unit is the time beyond which
the pooling may not be retroactive," and implied that prior to that date, the rule of
capture prevails. The dissenter would have allowed Farmers Irrigation District to share
in production only from the date an applicaton for spacing was filed, not as far back
as the date of first production.
83. 188 Neb. 260, 196 N.W.2d 181 (1972).
84. Id. at 261-62, 196 N.W.2d at 183.
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of first production. s5 The supreme court upheld the trial court "[n]ot
withstanding strong doubts on the equity of retroactivity."8 s6 It is im-
portant to note that the court did not question the rule laid down in
Farmers Irrigation District but merely expressed doubt about the lower
court's application of the rule to the facts.
In sum, the Supreme Court of Nebraska has held that pooling orders
may, when equitable, be effective retroactively to the date of first
production. Therefore, it is clear that this question is settled in Nebraska.
ANALYSIS
The jurisprudence from the above mentioned states illustrates the
varying policies and interests that must be considered in' determining
whether a unit order is effective retroactively. The states addressing the
question have come to different conclusions. The Texas Court of Appeal
has determined that pooling orders may not be retroactive at all.87
Oklahoma has concluded that the United States Constitution requires
that pooling orders be retroactive. 8 Nebraska has concluded that pooling
orders may be retroactive to the date of first production, but only when
that is equitable.8 9 The question remaining for discussion is whether
Louisiana may or must make unit orders effective retroactively.
As further analysis will show, the adjacent landowner may claim
that retroactivity is compelled to avoid the unconstitutional taking of
his property. On the other hand, the producing landowner could just
as easily argue that the taking of production which he has already
reduced to possession is a taking in itself. Before analyzing these claims
of both landowners, it is important to recall basic Louisiana mineral
concepts.
Prior to the creation of a unit, a producing landowner is free to
produce oil and gas that migrates from beneath the property of his
neighbor without sharing the production with his neighbor.9 Upon an
application for unitization, the Commissioner routinely denies adjacent
landowners the right to drill offset wells for the purpose of preventing
. waste and to avoid the drilling of unnecessary wells. 9' During the period
of time between the filing of the application and the issuance of the
85. Id. at 265, 196 N.W.2d at 185.
86. Id. at 266, 196 N.W.2d at 185. A prior order was vacated because the Secretary
of the Interior "had not determined that such pooling would be in the public interest."
Id. at 264, 196 N.W.2d at 185.
87. See supra text accompanying notes 38-50.
88. See supra text accompanying notes 51-73.
89. See supra text accompanying notes 74-86.
90. Desormeaux v. Inexco Oil Co., 298 So. 2d 897 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied,
302 So. 2d 37 (1974).
91. See supra note 7.
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order, however, the producing landowner is free to drain oil and gas
from beneath his neighbor without his neighbor being able to prevent
drainage. It is the production during this interim period that adjacent
landowners feel entitled to share, but that producers believe cannot be
taken from them.
The Taking Claim of the Adjacent Landowner
The Louisiana Mineral Code gives a landowner the "exclusive right
to explore and develop his property for the production" of oil and
gas. 92 An adjacent landowner could argue that denying him the right
to drill pending the issuance of a unit order deprives him of a property
right. 93 Thus, the landowner could argue that such a deprivation con-
stitutes a taking such that compensation is required.
In order to determine whether such a denial constitutes a taking,
one must first determine whether the right to drill constitutes a property
right.94 If the adjacent landowner's right to drill is not a property right,
then the denial of that right would not be a taking. If, however, we
conclude that the right to drill is a property right, constitutional issues
relative to state action in denying the right arise. 9 Louisiana Revised
Statute 31:15 provides that "[a] landowner may convey, reserve, or lease
his right to explore and develop his land for production of minerals
and reduce them to possession." 9 6 Such a provision clearly indicates that
92. La. R.S. 31:6 (1989).
93. Such an argument could be based upon the Oklahoma Supreme Court's reasoning
in C. H. Kuykendall v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 741 P.2d 869 (Okla. 1987).
94. " 'Property' is a word of very broad meaning and when used without qualification,
may reasonably be construed to include obligations, rights and other intangibles, as well
as physical things." Citizens State Bank of Barstow, Texas v. Vidal, 114 F.2d 380, 382
(10th Cir. 1940). Nowak, Rotunda and Young note:
Intangibles, ... and other nontraditional types of property may be protected
by the taking clause of the fifth amendment. The existence of the property
right will be determined with reference to state law. Once it has been determined
that a property interest exists in an intangible, the Court will inquire whether
the holder of the interest had a reasonable investment-backed expectation that
the property right would be protected.
J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young, Constitutional Law § 11.12, at 401 n.4 (3d ed.
1986).
95. Both the fifth and fourteenth amendments prohibit the taking of property without
due process. The fifth amendment provides that "[n]o person shall be ... deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation." Likewise, the fourteenth amendment provides
that "No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law .... .
State action must not violate these provisions. For this reason, State action which
infringes upon the rights of a person must be examined.
96. La. R.S. 31:15 (1989).
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the right to explore and develop may be conveyed and transferred and
that this right has value and worth. Louisiana Revised Statute 31:697
provides that this right is one exclusive to the landowner. Based upon
these articles, a landowner would clearly expect that this right constitutes
a property right.
The conclusion that the right to drill is a property right does not
compel the further conclusion that the denial of that right pending the
unit order is a taking. As the United States Supreme Court has pointed
out on numerous occasions, not every restriction of a property right
rises to the level of a taking. 9a The court, for example, has held that
regulatory action restricting the right to use one's property is a taking
requiring compensation only if the regulation denies all or substantially
all use of the property, results in a substantial reduction of the property's
value, or if no valid public purpose exists for that restriction.99 The
court in balancing these factors views the aggregate of rights associated
with property ownership as a "bundle of rights."' ' The destruction of
one "strand" in the bundle may not constitute a taking when viewing
the property in its entirety. 10'
The right to explore and develop may constitute a substantial portion
of a tract's value. For example, the right to explore and develop on
property in a south Louisiana marsh may constitute nearly all of that
property's value. In this case, the denial of the right to drill could,
under the Supreme Court's test, constitute a taking, for the restriction
deprives the owner of a substantial portion of the tract's value. Likewise,
the owner of a mineral servitude purchases from the landowner the right
to explore and develop. The denial in this case deprives the lessee of
all use of his right and therefore might also constitute a taking.
On the other hand, the right to explore and develop may not in
some instances constitute a substantial portion of the property's value.
The right to explore and develop on property upon which a multi-story
building rests may not constitute a substantial portion of the property's
value. Nor would the denial of this right prohibit substantial use of the
property. In this case, there would probably be no taking.
Whether a land use regulation constitutes a taking depends upon a
balance of the above mentioned factors. Because no one factor is ever
97. Id. art. 6.
98. See generally Note, First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los
Angeles: Compensation for Temporary Takings, 48 La. L. Rev. 947, 948-58 (1988).
99. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304, 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. De Benedictis, 489
U.S. 470, 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 43
S. Ct. 158 (1922).
100. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66, 100 S. Ct. 318, 326-27 (1979).
101. Id.
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the same, one may not categorically say whether the denial of the right
to explore and develop constitutes a taking. For purposes of this paper,
it is enough to conclude that the denial of this right under some
circumstances would constitute a taking.
Since adjacent landowners will have a taking claim in at least some
cases, it is important to provide a means of avoiding those claims. The
Oklahoma Supreme Court, for example, avoids violating the fifth amend-
ment by making pooling orders effective retroactively so that an adjacent
landowner who is denied the right to drill is compensated by sharing
in production from the time his right to drill is denied.'0 2 Louisiana,
like Oklahoma, denies an adjacent landowner the right to drill when
an application for unitization is filed. To prevent waste and the drilling
of unnecessary wells, the Commissioner of Conservation will not issue
a drilling permit while unitization is pending. 103 One solution then, is
to make all unit orders retroactive to the application for unitization.
This solution is not foolproof, however, as further analysis will show.
The Taking Claim of the Producer
Compensating the adjacent landowner for his right to drill by giving
unit orders retroactive effect could constitute the taking of oil and gas
owned by the producing landowner. Under the Louisiana Mineral Code
once a producing landowner reduces oil and gas to his possession, even
in the period of time pending the issuance of a unit order, he is vested
with ownership of that oil and gas. A producing landowner could argue
that he owns the oil and gas reduced to his possession pending the
issuance of a unit order and therefore a unit order effective retroactively
would constitute a taking of his property.
If Louisiana were to make unit orders effective retroactively, the
state would be compensating the landowner who was denied the right
to drill by taking from the producing landowner property in which he
has vested ownership. In other words, the state would be taking property
from one private person and giving it to another private person. The
United States Supreme Court, in Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utilities
Corp.,' °4 reiterated that "the taking of one man's property and giving
it to another" is unconstitutional. 05 In sum, making the order retroactive
to compensate the adjacent landowner is a constitutionally dubious course.
Recommendation
It is clear that under Louisiana's theory of mineral ownership,
Louisiana may not make. unit orders effective retroactively. At the same
102. See supra text accompanying notes 51-73.
103. See supra note 7.
104. 300 U.S. 55, 57 S. Ct. 364 (1937).
105. Id. at 79, 57 S. Ct. at 376.
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time it appears that Louisiana must make unit orders effective retro-
actively. This conflict is seemingly unresolvable.
One solution would be to further modify the rule of capture. Louis-
iana Revised Statute 30:4 provides that "[t]he Commissioner has juris-
diction and authority over all persons and property necessary to enforce
effectively the provisions of this Chapter and all other laws relating to
the conservation of oil or gas."'06 Having been granted such broad
authority, it would be within the Commissioner's power to require all
monies from oil or gas produced after an application for unitization is
filed to be escrowed pending the issuance of the unit order.1°7 Prior to
the filing of an application, the rule of capture would prevail and the
producing landowner would be free to produce oil and gas that migrates
from beneath his neighbor without sharing production with his neighbor.
Once an application for unitization was filed, ownership of oil and gas
produced after the filing would not be vested in the producing landowner.
Proceeds from this production could then be used to compensate adjacent
landowners whose right to drill was denied. After the issuance of the
unit order, all escrowed proceeds would be distributed such that each
tract received its just and equitable share. This approach would avoid
the complex problems of retroactivity while compensating those land-
owners who were prohibited from protecting their property from drain-
age.
CONCLUSION
One can conclude that denying an adjacent landowner the right to
drill constitutes an unconstitutional taking under the fifth amendment.
Therefore, the interests of the adjacent landowners must be protected.
One state facing a similar problem, Oklahoma, protects such rights by
making pooling orders effective retroactively to the date an application
for unitization is filed, which is the date on which the adjacent lan-
downer's right to drill is denied. 08 Louisiana, like Oklahoma, denies
adjacent landowners the right to drill once an application for unitization
is filed. 109 However, retroactivity is not an option in Louisiana. Ret-
roactivity, based on Louisiana's theory of mineral ownership, takes the
property of one individual and gives to another. Such action has been
interpreted as being unconstitutional.'10
Louisiana must fashion some alternative procedure for protecting
the rights and interests of both the producing landowner and the adjacent
106. La. R.S. 30:4 (1989).
107. Such a solution was used by Commissioner Patrick H. Martin and is currently
an issue in pending litigation.
108. See supra text accompanying notes 51-73.
109. See supra note 7.
110. See supra text accompanying notes 104-05.
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landowner who is prohibited from protecting his property from drainage.
This author concludes that such an alternative is available.
This author suggests that once an application for unitization is filed,
the Commissioner of Conservation should condition further production
on an agreement by the producing landowner to escrow monies obtained
from oil and gas produced after the filing. Prior to the filing, the rule
of capture should prevail and the producing landowner would be free
to produce oil and gas without sharing production with adjacent land-
owners.
This solution appears to be an equitable alternative to making unit
orders effective retroactively. This solution protects the rights and in-
terests of both the producing landowner and the adjacent landowner
who is prohibited from protecting his property from drainage while
avoiding the complex issues associated with retroactivity.
Stephen Schilde Williams

